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An indisputable “holy trinity”? On the moral value of equality, 
diversity, and inclusion 
 
Introduction 
Equality, diversity, and inclusion are three closely related concepts. The concept of diversity 
builds on the fact that there are numerous categories, often referred to as dimensions of 
diversity, that can be used to describe humans, and that humans can utilize to describe 
themselves. These dimensions of diversity, such as age, sexual orientation, gender, 
nationality, etc., can assume different shapes or manifestations; for example, being male, 
female, or intersex, in terms of the dimension of gender. Every human, at a given time, 
represents at least one manifestation of every dimension of diversity, within a given context. 
The vast number of shared similarities, and prevalent differences, between humans, alongside 
a conceptually infinite number of dimensions, represents the diversity of, for example, a given 
workforce, a nation, or even of humanity as a whole. Since it is often the case, in given 
contexts, that certain manifestations of specific dimensions are valued more highly than 
others, the concept of equality is concerned with the way in which an individual (or group) 
displaying specific manifestations (of any dimension of diversity) is related to that 
individual’s (or group’s) (un)equal  achievements, status, or access to resources. Figurative 
terms that are often used in this context, in order to describe the (un)equal positioning or 
standing of the representatives of differing manifestations of given dimensions of diversity, 
are ‘hierarchy’/‘hierarchization’ or ‘marginalization’. In this context, the concept of inclusion 
refers to the way that these differing manifestations are organized alongside, for example, 
societal, national, or organizational hierarchies; inclusion can also refer to the process of 
(de)hierarchizing these manifestations. Most voices in the academic and practical discourse 
on equality, diversity and inclusion assume that a high level of inclusion is positively related 
to a high level of equality amongst the representatives of the differing manifestations of the 
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dimensions of diversity in question. For many, the state of equality seems to be a positive 
condition per se, which is therefore worth striving for. Thus, it seems to have become an 
imperative that diversity should be handled (or managed) in a way that promotes the highest 
degree of inclusion and, with it, the highest degree of equality, possible. Average group 
values over the specific manifestations of each dimension of diversity often serve as an 
indicator for this degree. However, it would seem that, within the discourse on equality, 
diversity, and inclusion, it is equality that holds a central position. It seemingly prescribes and 
legitimates the way in which the inclusion of diversity should happen. The most common 
term for attempts towards this inclusion is ‘diversity management’. Literature on the moral 
value of EDI is very scarce (Byrd, 2018; Nkomo, 2014; Oswick and Noon, 2014; Sposato et 
al., 2015).  
Organizational or business research on EDI, which stresses its moral value, seldom reflects 
upon the specific moral perspective taken, its underlying basic assumptions, or potential 
points of criticism; for the most part, an everyday understanding of what might be morally 
praise- and blameworthy is applied (e.g. Jones et al., 2013). Questioning the moral value of 
EDI would seem to be taboo, which supports the view held by Nietzsche; he, through 
Zarathustra, compares the ‘preachers of equality’ with secretly vengeful ‘tarantulas’, hiding 
behind the word ‘justice,’ whose goal is to ensure that the “'will to equality' shall henceforth 
be the name for virtue” (Nietzsche, 1954, p. 100), whilst actually only serving their own “will 
to power.” This leads him to the dictum: “Mistrust all who talk much of their justice. […] 
And when they call themselves the good and the just, do not forget that they would be 
pharisees, if only they had — power” (Nietzsche, 1954, p. 100). Nietzsche exemplifies only 
one of many critical moral perspectives on EDI, which hitherto have been silent within the 
academic discourse on EDI. In the same way, the moral legitimacy and value of EDI is rarely 
expressed explicitly in this discourse, and is rarely embedded in concrete moral philosophies.  
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Although there seems to be a widespread and unquestioned consent, both in research and 
practice, that there is a moral value inherent in diversity and inclusion initiatives, there is a 
lack of theorizing with regard to this, as well as a lack of critically linking these initiatives and 
their underlying targets with specific moral philosophies. Most research in EDI implicitly 
values equality as something morally “good”, but this is mostly borne out of a political 
conviction, and without any ethical grounding. While a considerable amount of research has 
been conducted on different facets of the economic value of equality, diversity, and inclusion, 
very little research has been undertaken on its moral value (e.g. Köllen, 2016; van Dijk, 2017; 
van Dijk et al., 2012). Therefore, this paper aims at structuring the moral perspectives in EDI 
more precisely and more critically.  
The remainder of this introductory article for the special issue of EDI on “Moral Perspectives 
of Equality, Diversity, and Inclusion” is structured as follows. Firstly, we discuss the way in 
which initiatives towards diversity and inclusion are justified morally in literature. We point 
out the crucial position of equality, and then, secondly, we outline how the different 
approaches to equality attempt to achieve moral legitimacy. Since it comprises an important 
group of initiatives in this debate, we subsequently reflect upon the moral (il)legitimacy of 
affirmative action. The concluding section of this article provides a brief summary of the 
findings of this paper; it gives an overview of the contribution of the four papers of this 
special issue to the discourse on moral perspectives of equality, diversity, and inclusion, and it 
proposes streams for future research and discussions on this issue.   
   
Equality and the Moral “Goodness” of Initiatives towards Diversity and Inclusion  
Diversity management and related initiatives towards the inclusion of a diverse workforce are 
currently a globally widespread practice amongst organizations and territorial authorities, and 
the diffusion of such initiatives is still increasing (Martínez-Ariño et al., 2018; Vasconcelos, 
2017). Besides citing business case arguments for the implementation of these practices 
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(Heres and Benschop, 2010; Kulik, 2014; Soltani et al., 2012), organizations tend to present 
diversity management as some kind of morally ‘praiseworthy’ or ‘good’ organizational 
practice in their internal and external communication. They “often try to project the estimated 
‘goodness’ of these actions onto the actors themselves, aiming at giving the company [or 
organization] a general label of ethical ‘goodness’” (Köllen, 2016, p. 216). Often without 
stating it explicitly, “equality” is assumed to be a crucial indicator for the degree of 
organizational “goodness” (or even “justice”), which therefore, for many, can be seen as the 
intended, morally praiseworthy outcome of diversity management initiatives or organizational 
programs of “inclusion” of a diverse workforce (see e.g. Brewis, 2017).  
Diversity management is, then, assumed to be “socially just and morally desirable” (Lorbiecki 
and Jack, 2000, p. 21). Within the discourse on EDI, the “proper” management of a diverse 
workforce has become something of a “moral imperative” (O’Leary and Weathington, 2006; 
Vertovec, 2013). Romani et al. (2017) summarize this imperative as the “principle of 
representation, social responsibility, anti-discrimination and equal treatment [accomplished 
by] HRM practices that seek to blur, or somewhat minimise, the differences with which 
minority groups might contribute in the name of anti-discrimination and equality of treatment 
(the moral imperative)” (Romani et al., 2017, p. 273). 
The assumed moral value that is ascribed to these management practices is predominantly 
based on the same considerations that were, in the past, also referred to in order to legitimize 
equal opportunity and affirmative action (also referred to as “positive action”, “reservation”, 
or “employment equity”) programs, and to load them morally. From the standpoint of this 
morality, diversity management should aim at the same goals that equal opportunity or 
affirmative action (AA) initiatives did. One of these goals is adjusting the representation of 
certain manifestations of certain dimension of diversity (which, in the AA context, are mainly 
gender and race) on certain organizational levels, with regard to their representation in 
society. With diversity management, an additional business perspective has entered the 
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discourse; however, its moral value is almost exclusively deduced from its impact (or 
intention) in achieving some state of group-based equality. “Though arguments based on 
organizational self-interest might well be the norm amongst advocates of diversity, in 
principle nothing prevents diversity being argued for as a way of serving the very same moral 
ends as equal opportunity” (Kaler, 2001, p. 59). Cox (1993) describes this phenomenon in the 
following way: 
 “In most organizations the representation of culture groups in the overall work population, 
and especially in the most powerful positions, is highly skewed […which makes] equal 
opportunity issues prominent aspects of diversity work in organizations. […] Thus for nations 
and organizations that subscribe to a creed of equal opportunity, a major motive for investing 
in managing-diversity initiatives is that it is morally and ethically the right thing to do” (Cox, 
1994, p. 10). 
Some actors even label their diversity approach, and with it their contribution towards 
equality and inclusion, as an element of their “responsibility” towards society or humanity, 
and, in doing so, bestow upon themselves the quality of moral “goodness.” Its “moral grounds 
seem to touch more directly upon inclusion (of individuals), and then, upon equality, […] 
[being related to the] social responsibility of corporations […] and eventually a more 
egalitarian society”. (Romani et al., 2017, p. 274). The category of “equality” itself, then, is 
not called into question, and it effectively turns into a moral value in itself. 
Equality, therefore, is the (partial) goal of initiatives towards diversity and inclusion, which is 
frequently assumed to be morally desirable, and which attaches moral value to the initiatives 
themselves. In order to shed more light on the differing ways of attaching moral value to 
“equality”, the different notions of equality will be discussed in the next section, 
 
The Moral Legitimization of the Different Approaches towards Equality 
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Equality is mostly discussed in the form of equality of opportunity (Fleurbaey et al., 2017), 
equality of outcome, or, less frequently, equality of treatment (Dahlerup, 2007; Klarsfeld et 
al., 2016) for all employees, regardless of their diverse demographics or backgrounds. 
Organizations mostly present their attempts to work towards any of these forms of equality as 
something that is morally praiseworthy or morally good, although they only rarely accentuate 
this as being their primary incentive (Barclays, 2002; Demuijnck, 2009; Guarnieri and Kao, 
2008). In some cases quite explicitly (Fujimoto et al., 2013), but mostly in an implicit way, a 
state of equality is equated with a state of fairness and (social) justice (Brewis, 2017; Choi 
and Rainey, 2014). Depending on the form or type of equality in question, this perceived 
justice can then occur in the form of interactional justice (Bies, 2015), distributive justice 
(Villanueva-Flores et al., 2017), or procedural justice (Kim and Siddiki, 2018). In this 
context, the moral value of equality seems to be non-disputable and irrevocable (Frankfurt, 
1987; Westen, 1982), and the moral goodness of an organization (or at least of its values) 
seems to be determined by the ways in which it strives for equality, and the intensity with 
which it strives.  
In terms of the idealization of equality, Kaler (2001) distinguishes between three dominant 
positions in the discourse on equality and diversity: weak equal opportunity, strong equal 
opportunity, and equal group selection.  
Equal opportunity is about the attempt to provide one’s employees with the opportunity to 
compete “on an equal basis for unequal rewards […, whereby the] equal basis for competition 
provided by equal opportunity is selection of merit” (Kaler, 2001, p. 53). The merit in 
question here is one’s contribution to the organization’s objectives, although the matter of 
how these contributions can be valued in concrete terms remains open for discussion (Liff and 
Wajcman, 1996). However, it is safe to assume that mere demographics, such as race, sexual 
orientation, or gender per se, cannot be considered as being meritorious. In case the unequal 
distribution of rewards is solely due to unequal merits, the weak equal opportunity approach 
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backs unequal outcomes. This approach legitimizes diversity and inclusion initiatives which 
counteract selections or decisions that are based on social group-memberships, alongside the 
differing dimensions of workforce diversity. However, if certain merits are inherent in certain 
group-memberships or demographics, a group-related, unequal distribution of outcome is 
acceptable (Kaler, 2001). Examples of meritorious characteristics are, amongst others, self-
confidence, the qualifications of individuals, commitment, aplomb, ambition, and experience. 
Going one step further than the mere possession of such characteristics, the strong equal 
opportunity approach also takes into account the potential of the individual to acquire them, 
and to develop them further. Equal opportunities for all individuals, from this perspective, 
would demand that every individual had the same full potential for acquiring them.  
As group-specific barriers might impede the attempts of some individuals to acquire these 
characteristics, the strong equal opportunity approach backs diversity and inclusion initiatives 
which exclusively support specific groups, in order to make the members of these groups 
more competitive in the struggle for unequal rewards. Such group-specific barriers are often 
based on, or related to, group-specific ways of being socialized, general social stereotyping, 
and, especially in the case of the dimension of gender, the way in which domestic 
responsibilities are traditionally distributed (Blaine and McClure Brenchley, 2018; McMillan‐
Capehart, 2005). The strong equal opportunity approach proceeds on the assumption that 
work, and the definition of work-related merits, are not race-, gender-, sexual orientation-, 
etc.-, neutral. Since each dimension of diversity has, from this perspective, privileged 
manifestations in a given context (Acker, 2006; van Dijk et al., 2017), this approach allows 
remedial initiatives of diversity and inclusion. These initiatives, then, can exclusively address 
and support representatives of underprivileged manifestations of the respective dimensions of 
diversity; for example, black, female, foreign, or homosexual employees. The strong equal 
opportunity approach, therefore, legitimizes the unequal treatment of employees, through 
practices that are often rhetorically framed as affirmative actions or positive actions. This 
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reverse discrimination allows the provision of certain groups of employees with resources to 
which others may not have access (Newton, 1973; Taylor, 1973). On an averaged group-
perspective, one result of such an approach might be the equality of outcome, but this is not 
perforce the primary goal of this approach.  
“Equality of outcome”, in the form of achieving representativeness in all working areas and 
on all hierarchy levels, is rather the explicit ideal/typical goal of a third approach to equality: 
the equal group selection approach. “Its ideal outcome is a situation in which every workforce 
is more or less representative of all the social groupings available to it” (Kaler, 2001, p. 53). 
Any measure that is legitimized by the strong equal opportunity approach is also legitimized 
in this approach, which additionally legitimizes quota systems. Focusing primarily on an 
individual’s demographics or group membership, instead of his or her merits, (e.g. when 
making decisions pertaining to recruitment and promotions), makes this approach, strictly 
speaking, unrelated to “equal opportunities”; it is no longer about an equal competition for 
scarce resources.  
Approaches to equality, which emphasize the goal of representativeness, are often labelled as 
“radical” approaches. Approaches to equality, which put an emphasis on the merits of the 
individual, are often labelled as “liberal” approaches. This distinction was coined by Jewson 
and Mason (1986); it is a distinction, that is often referred to as the ‘sameness-difference 
debate’ (Greene, 2015). Intersectional perspectives utilizing this simplistic distinction 
between radical and liberal approaches partially integrate other dimensions such as age, class, 
and race (e.g. Acker, 2006; Berger and Guidroz, 2010), but the academic discourse on this 
issue revolves predominantly around  the dimension of gender. The very influential and oft-
cited paper from Liff & Wajcman (1996) exemplifies this issue. This is why, within this 
discourse, the distribution of caring responsibilities between women and men is a central issue 
(Leitner, 2003); this is an issue that is non-transferable to other dimensions of workforce 
diversity.  
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Drawing on Kaler’s (2001) classification of approaches to equality, it is the equal group 
selection approach and, with certain qualifications, the strong equal opportunity approach that 
provide legitimacy for direct intervention aiming at redistributing power and resources 
between social groups. The most widely used term for these interventions, representing some 
kind of positive discrimination, is affirmative actions (AA). These actions can also include 
quotas for the differing manifestations of certain dimensions of workforce diversity. 
However, political motivations aside, the topic of how these actions are justifiable morally 
will now be discussed.     
 
The Moral (Il-)Legitimacy of Affirmative Actions 
One group of arguments in favor of affirmative actions, no matter whether they are labelled as 
such within organizational diversity management initiatives, is related to the consequences of 
these actions. Besides potentially positive economic consequences, other alleged positive 
consequences of these actions are also pointed out in literature. 
One line of argument in favor of organizational interventions towards redistributing resources 
and power from “over”represented groups to “under”represented ones sees the impact of role 
models for members of hitherto underrepresented groups as positive. Providing these groups 
with such role models might motivate them to follow in their footsteps, or, at least, it might 
contribute towards convincing them that their demographic per se is not a reason for not 
working in a given area, or at a given level (Securius-Carr and Rohr, 2018; Singh et al., 
2006). The basic assumption of this argument is related to a second line of argument.  
This line of argument states that segregation (or “exclusion”) is “bad”. Segregation is any 
state of unrepresentativeness, on whatever hierarchy level or working area, in terms of any 
dimension of diversity. Overcoming it is seen as “good”, since “that integration of racial, 
ethnic, and other groups that mark significant lines of social inequality is a vital ideal for a 
democratic society, necessary for its basic institutions to function successfully” (Anderson, 
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2010, p. X). With reference to racial segregation in US society, Anderson (2010) alleges that 
“if segregation is a fundamental cause of social inequality and undemocratic practices, then 
integration promotes greater equality and democracy. Hence, it is an imperative of justice. It 
is also a positive good. It should appeal to us as well as command us to action” (Anderson, 
2010, p. 2). Therefore, for Anderson, any race-based affirmative actions that aim at 
overcoming this segregation are morally legitimate; she very much connects it with her 
conviction that democracy is worth protecting, and segregation might destabilize democracy:    
“Segregation of social groups is a principal cause of group inequality. It isolates 
disadvantaged groups from access to public and private resources, from sources of human and 
cultural capital, and from the social networks that govern access to jobs, business connections, 
and political influence. It depresses their ability to accumulate wealth and gain access to 
credit. It reinforces stigmatizing stereotypes about the disadvantaged and thus causes 
discrimination. Segregation also underm nes democracy” (Anderson, 2010, p. 2). These 
arguments are intuitively comprehensible; however, they lack a clear ethical grounding. 
Furthemore, they do not resolve the conflict between the standpoint that every individual 
deserves the same respect, treatment, and opportunities (for whatever reason), and the fact 
that these practices make the individual a prisoner of her or his demographics.     
Another line of argument is less concerned with the consequences of these initiatives, but 
legitimates AA as rectification for historical injustice. In the context of the US, Jarvis 
Thomson (2013) morally justifies the systematic disadvantaging of white males through AA 
in two ways. Firstly, the potential that they might have benefitted from policies that have 
advantaged them in the past. Secondly, she derives its legitimacy from the competitive 
advantage that, in her opinion, was available to white males through their higher level of 
confidence, which was a product of their higher status (Jarvis Thomson, 2013). Others take 
the same line by arguing that disadvantaging certain individuals because of their 
demographics or group-membership is legitimate when this membership is related to certain 
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competitive advantages that non-members do not receive, or have not received in the past. 
From this perspective, reverse discrimination seems to be justified, as being a compensation 
for disadvantaging that has been experienced in the past (Boxill, 1972; Sher, 1975). Since the 
group-memberships in question, (such as being female, white, transgender, and heterosexual), 
have not been chosen by their members, Lippert-Rasmussen (2017) categorizes these 
arguments as “innocent beneficiary argument[s] for affirmative action” (Lippert‐Rasmussen, 
2017, p. 74), from which its advocates derive the “putative obligations of the innocent 
beneficiaries of past injustice to benefit the involuntary victims of those past injustices” 
(Lippert‐Rasmussen, 2017, p. 73). However, what is designated “justice” from this 
perspective can only count for group-averages, since not every individual is perforce a victim 
or beneficiary of historic “injustice”. Disentangling the underlying beneficiary principle (see 
e.g. Butt, 2014) from the concept of luck egalitarianism, Lippert-Rasmussen (2017) shows 
that “affirmative action is never required by justice because of a duty for the innocent 
beneficiaries of past injustice to compensate their victims” (Lippert‐Rasmussen, 2017, p. 77). 
However, from the perspective of luck egalitarianism, striving for some kind of distributive 
justice, AA can be justified on the group level, but not as a duty on the individual level 
(Lippert-Rasmussen, 2017).  
 
Conclusion, this Special Issue, and Future Research 
 
Conclusion 
Morally evaluating equality, diversity and inclusion remains an under-theorized field. Within 
the discourse on equality, diversity and inclusion, the term ‘justice’ is predominantly used in a 
more intuitive way, and is mostly not rooted in a specific philosophy. Just as “there is no 
sound general answer to the question “is affirmative action just?”” (Lippert‐Rasmussen, 2017, 
p. 76), one can also not expect an indisputable answer to the question as to whether any 
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approach towards equality, diversity and inclusion is morally praiseworthy or just. However, 
much more critical reflection and theorizing of the moral value (i.e., the moral ‘goodness’ or 
‘evilness’) of the differing approaches is required. Instead of implicitly applying prescriptive 
ethics, which are mostly based on intuitive reasoning, or simple political convictions, future 
research could enrich the discourse on the moral evaluation of diversity management, 
inclusion programs, and organizational equality approaches, with new philosophical facets 
and perspectives; perspectives that might differ from those taken in the predominantly 
American discourse. This special issue hopes to contribute to this endeavor through the four 
contributions included within it. 
 
Articles included in this Special Issue 
The article “Ethics and intercultural communication in diversity management” by Eila 
Isotalus and Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila demonstrates the need for a radically new 
approach to diversity management, which shifts the focus in diversity management on 
meanings and communication. The central role of meanings should be obvious, with the 
perception that all diversity categories (such as sexual orientation, race, gender, etc) are 
loaded with contextually varying cultural meanings. Furthermore, these diversity categories 
are neither ethically nor politically neutral, hence presenting the challenge of deconstructing 
value hierarchies, detrimental both from the ethical and economic perspectives. To improve 
team performance and product quality, team members need to overcome stereotypical 
categorizations, and get to know each other’s methods of thinking and acting. For the 
development of the dialogical skills needed to promote healthy communication practices, the 
paper introduces negotiating reality dialogue developed by Ariane Berthoin Antal and Victor 
Friedman. Because putting such diversity management measures into practice presupposes 
both emotional and cognitive development, its challenges are discussed in terms of 
Aristotelian virtue ethics. 
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The article ”Justice as fairness in the workplace: A trajectory for managing diversity” by   
Pradeepa Dahanayake, Diana Rajendran, Christopher Selvarajah, and Glenda Ballantyne  
extends the discourse on the moral evaluation of diversity management, inclusion programs, 
and organizational equality approaches, by introducing conceptual tools to bridge the gap 
between literature on organizational justice and diversity management, and by the empirical 
analysis of two cases highlighting the significance of this approach. The conceptual analysis 
consists of, firstly, presenting four categories of workplace justice (distributive, procedural, 
interpersonal, and informational justice) and four theories of justice (equity theory, social 
exchange theory, and John Rawl’s and Amartya Sen’s theories of social justice) and, 
secondly, discussing their relevance to diversity management. Both of the two cases consist of 
comparing diversity practices and consequences in two organizations in Australia with the 
help of the conceptualization of justice and fairness as described. Two organizations are 
compared with respect to their gender pay inequity measures; the other two with respect to 
their means of coping with cultural diversity. Significant differences between the compared 
organizations yield a vivid picture of the complexity of issues linking justice and diversity 
management. 
The article “HPWS and climate for inclusion: A moral legitimacy lens” by Jennifer Harrison, 
Janet Boekhorst, and Yin Yu offers a conceptual model to expand the notion of climate for 
inclusion (CFI) to include moral legitimacy assessments of employees on the organization’s 
human relations policies, specified as high-performance work systems (HPWS). The moral 
legitimacy assessments of inclusion-oriented HPWS are conceptualized through the 
application of Suchman’s (1995) four categories: structural, procedural, conseque tial, and 
personal. In the model, the employee’s moral identity is offered as a factor influencing the 
person’s assessment of each of the four dimensions. To form a collective evaluation of 
climate for inclusion, the variability of climate assessments between organizational groups, 
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such as majority and minority groups, is taken into account as a mediating factor between 
individual- and collective-level perceptions. 
Looking at the most significant international documents on disability, the article “Remarks on 
Disability Rights Legislation” by John-Stewart Gordon and Felice Tavera-Salyutov reviews 
the history of disability rights legislation. Drawing on the concept of “human rights”, the 
authors identify patterns that in future could be crucial for the disability movement. They 
describe a fully inclusive and allembracing society as a utopian goal that it is worth striving 
for, a goal that only can be reached when people with impairments are fully included. 
 
Future research 
Future research could continue to derive the moral value, or question the value, of different 
approaches to EDI from the perspective of specific moral philosophies. Future research might 
also apply a perspective of deontological (e.g. Hegel, 1821, 1991; Kant, 1785; 2011, or 
others), asking whether organizations and/or individuals within these organizations do indeed 
have an obligation or duty (or even responsibility) towards approaching equality, diversity, 
and inclusion in a certain way. The question might be asked, from the perspective of virtue 
ethics (e.g. Anscombe, 1958; Aquinas, 1570; Aristotle, 2000; Plato, 1907, or others), as to 
whether there is a virtuous way of approaching EDI within organizations, and, if so, what the 
most virtuous way might be. From a utilitarian perspective (e.g. Bentham, 1789; Mill, 1863, 
or others) the question might be asked as to how organizations, or individuals within 
organizations, should approach EDI in order to maximize categories such as welfare, 
happiness, autonomy, etc. From these perspectives, or from the perspective of other moral 
philosophies, research might question how existing organizational or individual approaches to 
EDI can be evaluated morally. Another research stream could focus on the role of the 
incentives of organizations or individuals in their efforts regarding EDI. The question might 
be posed as to how genuine incentives determine the moral praiseworthiness/blameworthiness 
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of organizational approaches to EDI (e.g. applying ethics from  (e.g. applying ethics from 
Hume, 1751; Schopenhauer, 1860; 2010, or others). Future research could also examine more 
closely how the attribution of moral worth to different approaches to EDI might be unmasked 
and deconstructed as a mere means to other ends. Philosophical perspectives on the notional 
and moral worth of equality and inequality as such could be developed further. Research 
could examine whether (certain) organizational inequalities could be “just,” morally 
acceptable, or even morally praiseworthy, or even whether equality is a moral category at all. 
Future research could also direct its attention towards moral perspectives of quota systems 
and affirmative actions, asking what kind of understanding of “equality” these measures 
express, and how (dis)advantaging of certain groups of employees can be evaluated morally.    
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